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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Abstract 
This note explains the circumstances that created the recent economic turmoil in Dubai. It analyses the 
consequences of the bailout the government ultimately enforced. It questions the role rating agencies play 
in such crises and suggests regulation of their activities. Finally, it warns of challenges Dubai is likely to 
face in years ahead. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The Government of Abu Dhabi and the UAE Central Bank stepped in the nick of time with a $10 
billion bailout offer for the state run Dubai World which had recently got stuck in billions of 
dollar debt mire. Of the allocated amount, $4.1 billion was meant to take care of the World’s 
immediate debt obligations comprising Islamic bonds (sukuk) of Nakheel - the property 
development arm of the company. The amount was falling due on December 14, the very day 
support was pledged. Nakheel has since met its obligation within the stipulated time limit. The 
remaining $5.9 billion of the pledge was earmarked to help meet the obligations to trade 
creditors and contractors of the World. Contrary to what some perceived, it was not an 
unexpected step; many, including the IMF, could see and hailed the on coming UAE move to 
address the crisis. For failure to help could have even led to the disintegration of the UAE.  
Dubai World had rather abruptly asked for time from its creditors until end of May 2010 to repay 
their loans of about $59 billion. The announcement caused a quiver in the global financial 
markets. The element of suddenness resulted in a failure of reaction to distinguish delay from 
default. The bailout announcement calmed the nerves reassuring investors, financial and trade 
creditors, employees, and common people that the government will always act to uphold the 
market principles and globally acceptable business practices. Stock markets in no time turned 
their tails up. US dollar looked up against the Yen; The Euro climbed them both. Asian credit 
default swaps tightened and the risk appetite got boosted. 
Dubai economy was initially raised on petro-dollars, but the fast dwindling oil reserves of the 
emirate made her take to diversifying the economy. The emirate decided to develop service and 
tourism sectors: it positioned itself as an international finance, trading and sports centre. High 
rise buildings, grand hotels, and luxury resorts soon dotted the land all around. Property prices 
were on gallop until the close of 2006. Then the tide of global crisis reached this tiny outpost 
also. The debacle started with her booming real estate industry going bust at the start of 2008. 
Exuberance in a promising market had created excess supply: property prices crashed – the 
average fall being around 40% of their value in 2009 alone: sales were slowing, profit margins 
were vanishing. The abrupt declaration on November 26 by Dubai government asking the 
creditors to reschedule repayment put the financial world in panic. Shares went tumbling across 
the world. 
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The reaction was sharper in the West as boom in the emirate was heavily financed by foreign 
funds, especially the European banks like RBS and Standard Chartered. Developing countries 
did not express much concern. India feared though the unemployment of her workers the crisis 
could cause, but the overall feel was that mountain was being made out of molehill. Her finance 
minister observed: first the [Rupee] amount involved was small; second, the exposure of the 
Indian banking system to Dubai was limited. The statement largely reflected the sentiment in the 
Asian countries.  
Sukuk – the Islamic bonds – have been under cloud since the time Taqi Usmani questioned their 
Shari’ah compliance in most cases (85%) slowing down their popularity. One consequence is 
that experts tend to sermon in whatever adversity they find the presence of the sukuk. Dubai 
crisis has been no exception. Most comments, including some coming from the more sober 
academic world, contained disproportionate voicing of alarm and warning on the role of the 
Islamic bonds in Dubai turmoil.   
One reason why sukuk attracted the attention of the market in the fiasco was that their payment 
due on December 14 was the centre of the time-resetting negotiations: Islamic bonds so to say 
triggered the crisis. The government announcement of its intention to enforce payment 
rescheduling immediately led both Moody’s and Standard services to heavily downgrade the 
Islamic sukuk along with bonds of various government related entities in Dubai. A more realistic 
approach could not have missed the point that the amount due on sukuk was no more than 6 -7% 
of the total money involved and failure had not yet taken place. Rating agencies could have 
shown a little more restraint in their decisions. They wield enormous power in the global bond 
markets: they can literally make or unmake a government not by actual downgrading but by 
merely announcing the intention to do so. There are increasing murmurs in financial circles as to 
why these agencies are allowed to continue rating debt issues? As the bond issuers themselves 
have to pay for the evaluation exercise, there candidly is scope for the ratings moving in tandem 
with the payments. It is not very clear what rules of conduct these agencies follow, who design 
these rules and who oversees their observance: There is presumably a case for setting up 
regulatory frameworks for the rating agencies even for establishing separate ones for Islamic 
bonds. 
Some analysts looked at the Dubai fiasco from a historical angle. To them, the seeds of Dubai 
turmoil were sown the moment Sheikh Mohammad took the decision to invest his wealth as also 
of the emirate in the US real estate markets through the foreign arm of Emaar – the second 
largest property developer on the scene. The company ultimately went bankrupt extending in the 
process the US subprime crisis to the emirate. The American connection links well with 
Washington and Abu Dhabi putting pressure on Dubai to join the ‘international community’ in 
taking a tougher line on Iran, one of main trade partners of the emirate. Dubai has also decided to 
enact immediately an insolvency law on the US-British model to provide protection to local 
companies like the World from its creditors. Abu Dhabi may also be looking for some 
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concessions from the emirate in return for providing her the bailout. It may, for instance, seek 
concessions on trade with Iran and on the future of Emirates Airline. Here is in operation 
economics to meet political ends or precisely, the political economy of the region. 
Sukuk was not the issue in Dubai crisis as some have tried to make it. Sukuk market remained 
calm and unaffected across countries including the leading one in Malaysia. The emirate was in 
part a victim of global meltdown and was in part overtaken by unguarded optimism and 
mismanagement. The crisis has compromised her reputation as an economic power house in the 
region it may find difficult to retrieve. It also faces the daunting task of restructuring the 
remaining $22 billion of Dubai World’s debts. More importantly, what is going to be the fate of 
its huge investments sunk in high value property mostly in anticipation of foreign demand, 
especially from the West. This demand may not be picking up for quite sometime. The future is 
quite uncertain, if not bleak. The emirate must proceed with caution.  
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